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KENTUCKY 
UNIVERSITY 
Vol. XIII , No. 2, May 1995 
FROM THE EDITOR 
\''lII'I-,otio America: Partners in Progress 
America and North America often have ap-
to be light years away from each other, despite 
proximity, crosscultural relationships, and 
economies. Part of the problem has been 
lack of communication between the two 
communities and interest 
historically has taken ei-
i Latin America or has 
•
. ~i~~~~ a policy of benign On occasions when 
States has I involved in the 
region, it usually is in crisis i of a natural or 
political nature. Moreover, a perception of 
U.S. involvement in Latin i that of heavy-
handed interference in domestic Nicaragua, 
Chile , Mexico, Cuba, and the Republic 
spring immediately to mind as of overt or 
covert U.S. mititary involvement. 
Perhaps the most productive 
communication between the two re,.lrr.s 
the local, grassroots level. Person to 
nity to community, and family to 
have become a crucial component of hs~~~:~~~~}~(f~ 
operation and communication . This is e 
recent years with the continued assault on official 
ing for bilateral aid, non-governmental activities, and 
educational exchanges. 
Two examples from Bowling Green, Kentucky, illus-
trate the role that individuals and communities can play 
in bringing the two realms closer together. Under the 
auspices of the Sister City International program, Bowl-
ing Green is in partnership with Santo Domingo de los 
Colorados in Ecuador. In October, 1994, an official del-
egation from Santo Domingo journeyed to Bowling 
Green to participate in the city's annual international 
festival and to interact with counterparts in the commu-
nity. City government officials, the Chamber of Com-
merce, business people , WKU faculty, staff, and stu-
dents, and members of the Bowling Green community 
came together to host the delegation and to provide ac-
commodations, meals, entertainment, and support. 
In March, 1995, the Santo Domingo community recip-
rocated by hosting a Sister City delegation from BOWl-
ing Green. Three members of the Bowling Green Sis-
ter City committee traveled to Santo Domingo to help 
develop a number of programs and to facilitate contacts 
between Santo Domingo officials and other organiza-
tions. The delegation experienced first-hand the prob-
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lems facing communities in Latin America such as 
Santo Domingo. High-school exchange programs, cul-
tural contacts, Chamber-to-Chamber business relation-
ships, and teacher exchanges were just a few of the 
issues the two Sister City committees discussed in 
Santo Domingo. 
I important in building communication links be-
•';~;;~;~~th:;e two realms is the Partners of the Americas ~~~\~:~:~~~~is~li~n~ke;:d with Ecuador" and has a and mutual support pro-grams, paths to the development 
rial 
Th, 
this j 
reflect the 
opinions of i 
Latin America is the transfer 
the Sister Cities and 
'lorarr" have been active in 
, and basic technol-
Especially important 
health care. Vital sup-
medical and dental materi-
materials regularly are carried to 
from Bowling Green. Moreover, 
Sister City and Partners programs ea-
i medical, dental , agricultural , educa-
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tional, and business expertise with local communities in 
Ecuador. In return, members of the community in cities 
such as Santo Domingo share aspects of their lan-
guage, culture, and society with their partners here in 
Bowling Green In order to foster a broader and deeper 
understanding of the two realms. 
We all can do more to reach out to our partners in 
progress in both realms. I encourage Intercambio read-
ers to make an extra effort this year to get involved in 
community groups that faci litate communication be-
tween the two cultures and to write at least one letter of 
support to a colleague in the opposite realm. Our 
friendship and mutual support network will be strength-
ened by your actions. 
Until our Fall issue of Intercambio, hasta luego y un 
fuerte abrazo. 
David J. Keeling, Editor 
Department o( Geography and Geology 
CUBA: DEMISE OF CASTRO? 
Ken Johnson 
Department of Government 
Eastern Kentucky University 
Cuba has endured a severe economic crisis since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 . The severity 
of the crisis, combined with the perceived lack of alter-
natives for overcoming it, have led many observers to 
predict the impending fa ll of Fidel Castro, the lider max-
imo of Cuba for the past 35 years. Many consider the 
most recent (August 1994) mass exodus of Cubans to 
the U.S. as a sure sign of widespread discontent among 
the Cuban people with Castro's regime. It is popularly 
assumed that this discontent eventually will force Cas-
tro from power. Thus, the 32-year old U.S. policy of 
isolating Cuba is geared to generating as much discon-
tent on the island as possible in the hope of encourag-
ing Castro's demise. 
This interpretation of the latest immigration crisis and 
its implications for Castro's survival is too simplistic and 
amounts to wishful thinking among those who would like 
to see Castro gone. My analysis is based on three ob-
servations. First, despite the severity of the crisis in 
Cuba, its nature remains largely economic, not political. 
Second, the nature of Castro's power makes his demise 
unlikely. Castro has a proven track record in using ad-
versity to enhance his power. Third , the U.S. policy of 
isolating Cuba has failed , so far, to dislodge Castro or 
even weaken his power, despite the manifold hardships 
this power has wreaked on the Cuban people. 
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The Nature of the Crisis 
Although there is an immigration crisis that clearly is 
tied tp an economic crisis, no obvious political crisis ex-
ists in Cuba to threaten Castro's power. 
The Immigration Crisis: During the month of August, 
1994, nearly 30,000 Cubans sought 10 escape Cuba by 
making a ha1-ardous raft trip to Florida . This was the 
largest exodus since the 1980 Mariel boat lift , which 
brought 125,000 Cubans 10 Miami over three monlhs 
during the twilight of Carter's presidency. However, the 
sheer numbers did not make this situation a crisis. 
Rather, the crisis arose from the lack of agreement on 
how to control migration between Cuba and the U.S. in 
an orderly , mutually acceptable manner. Immigration 
crises occur whenever large number of Cubans are 
forced to use illegal means to migrate because legal 
channels have become blocked by either the Cuban or 
U.S. governments. 
Historically, a clear pattern has existed in the immi-
gration crises that periodically have punctuated U.S.-
Cuban relationships. Whenever there is a lack of a mi-
gration agreement between the two countries, or when 
an existing agreement is effectively abrogated by one 
or both sides, a crisis erupts and Castro gives the green 
light to Cubans to leave as they wish. For example, the 
lack of a migration agreement from 1962-1965 after the 
missile criSiS, and the consequent imposition of an em-
bargo, around Cuba, resulted in pent-up migratory de-
mand that Castro finally released in 1965. The Johnson 
administration was forced to establish the policy of giv-
ing Cubans refugee status automatically. Then, from 
1973 onwards, the U.S. began restricting the number of 
Cubans it processed for visas, which effectively 
(although not rorma lly) altered the 1966 Johnson Ad-
ministration policy . In tum, this created more pent-up 
migratory demand leading in part to the 1980 Mariel cri-
sis . President Carter accepted the immigrants into the 
U.S. on humanitarian and ideological grounds. This 
proved to be high ly unpopular with the U.S. public, es-
pecially when it became clear that 45% of the man'elitos 
had criminal records and therefore were excludable un-
der U.S. immigration taw. Another' immigration agree-
ment had to wait until 1984, at wh ich time the Reagan 
Administration decided to ailow up to 20.000 Cubans 
each year into the U.S. and to accept political prisoners 
and their families as refugees. But Cubans would no 
longer be granted automatic immigrant status. Instead, 
Cubans now would be treated the same as immigrants 
from other countries. This agreement worked well untit 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the number of 
visa applicants to the U.S. began to skyrocket. 
The latest crisis was due in part to the failure of the 
U.S. government to abide by its 1984 immigration 
agreement with Cuba, in which it agreed to take up to 
20,000 Cubans per year. Currently there is a backlog 
of 19,000 visa applications in the U.S. Interests Section 
(consulate) in Havana. For the past severa l years, the 
U.S. government has allowed only about 5-6,000 
Cubans to enter the country legally. As the economy 
and living conditions in Cuba have plummeted during 
the last four years, the number of Cubans applying for 
U.S. visas has skyrocketed. Given this growing backlog 
of visa applications, desperate Cubans began pinning 
their hopes instead on the trade winds of the Flori da 
Straits. 
In the face of a tightening U.S. embargo against Cuba 
(The Cuba Democracy Act or Torricelli Law of 1992), 
and the U.S. refusal to process the number of visa ap-
plicants stated in the 1984 agreement , Castro once 
again gave the green light, in July 1994, to any Cuban 
wanting to leave the island. And once again this act 
forced the U.S. (this time, the Clinton Administrati on) to 
negotiate a migration agreement with Cuba . The 
September 9th agreement signed in New York basically 
reiterated the 1984 Reagan policy: the U.S. agreed to 
(1) admit up to 20,000 Cubans per year, (2) grant imme-
diate refugee status to the several thousand applicants 
who were close relatives of exiles in the U.S., and (3) to 
treat Cuban immigrants the same as immigrants from 
other countries. For his part , Castro agreed to stop en-
courag ing illegal emigration from Cuba. 
The immigration crises have benefitted Castro in a 
number of ways. First , they have forced the U.S. to the 
negotiating table at Castro 's initiative . Second, each 
crisis has given Castro an opportunity to denounce the 
embargo and to shift blame for Cuba 's problems to the 
U.S. policy of isolation. Third, they have permitted Cas-
tro to get rid of dissidents and undesirables, thus 
strengthening his hold on power. 
The periodic immigration crises, of course, are symp-
tomatic of dissatisfaction with the political , economic, 
and social conditions on the island. The most fre-
quently cited reasons for leaving Cuba include the de-
sire to be reunited with exiled family members and the 
hope for a better quality of life than currently is avail-
able on the island. 
The Economic Crisis. The economic crisis has three 
aspects: (1) the breakdown of concessionary trade rela-
tionships with the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern bloc in 
1990; (2) the continuing embargo of the U.S.; and (3) 
the poor prospects for a viable economic future given 
aspects (1) and (2) . 
Prior to 1990, Cuba had a concessionary trade rela-
tionship with the Soviets. During the 1980s, Soviet as-
sistance to Cuba averaged between $225-430 per 
capita, or 15-30% of Cuba 's national income. The Sovi-
ets purchased Cuban sugar and nickel well above world 
prices, while it sold oil to Cuba at below world prices. 
Cuba then would sell some of the surplus oil it produced 
or refined at home on the world market to earn hard 
currency. This very favo rable arrangement created a 
high degree of trade dependence between Cuba and 
COMECON (the Soviet economic bloc). In 1988, 85% 
of Cuba's imports came from COMECON, wh ile 81 % of 
Cuba's exports went to COMECON . 
With the fall of communism beginning in the late 
19805, and the transition to market economies during 
the early 1990s, Cuba's special trade relationship with 
COMECON has come to an end . Cuba now must trade 
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with the former U.S.S.R . and Eastern bloc countries us-
ing hard currency at world market prices in competition 
with other countries. The result has been disastrous for 
the economy and people of Cuba. Over the past four 
years, Cuba 's national income has fallen 50% (-4% in 
1990, -25% in 1991, and -15% in 1993). Imports from 
form er COMECON countries are down by 90%. In 
1992, oil imports were 1I1Oth of 1989 levels, fertilizer 
imports were 1/5th of 1989 levels, and animal feed im-
ports were 1/4 of 1989 levels. Meanwhile , the prices of 
imported wheat, cRicken, and milk have risen between 
16% and 40%, whil e prices for Cuba's two major ex-
ports have decreased precipitously. Nickel exports are 
down 20% and sugar prices are down by 28%. Bad 
weather in 1993 destroyed 50% of Cuba's sugar har-
vest, giving it the smallest crop of the century. As a 
result , Cuba 's foreign exchange earnings declined by 
approximately 73% between 1989 and 1992. In 1992, 
Cuba cou ld afford only about 1/3rd the amount of im-
ports purchased in 1989. There are chronic food and 
medicine shortages, which lead to nutritional diseases 
in a country that on ly a few years ago boasted the best 
health statistics in Latin America. There are few cars 
and buses in operation. Cubans of all ages now must 
walk or ride one of the millions of Chinese-built bicycles 
that have been imported because gasol ine is beyond 
the reach of the Cuban treasu ry . Oxen ratherthan trac-
tors now plow the fields, giving Cuba a surrea list feel of 
having fallen back in time a century or more. 
Although, stri ctly speaking, the U.S. embargo didn 't 
"cause- the current crisis in Cuba, it certain ly is con-
tributing to Cuba's economic problems by mak.ing re-
covery extremely difficult . The 32-year old U.S. em-
bargo of Cuba is the most stringent ever appl ied by the 
U.S. to any country. 11 seeks to prohibit: (a) U.S. firms 
and subsidiaries from trading with Cuba; (b) the impor-
tati on from any country of any product that contains 
even trace amounts of Cuban inputs; (c) firms operat-
ing outside the U.S. from selling Cuban products with 
more than a 20% U.S. content; (d) foreign banks in the 
U.S. from keeping dollar accounts for Cuba or conduct-
ing transactions with Cuba in dollars: and (e) ships 
from docking in the U.S. for 3 months after those ships 
have docked in a Cuban port. In add ition to these legal 
proh ibitions, the U.S. govemment has used diplomatiC 
and pol it ical pressure to prevent fo reign fi rms and gov-
ernments from trading with Cuba. The embargo's im-
pact on the Cuban economy from 1962 to 1990 is esti-
mated at S38 billion in lost national income. Moreover, 
the embargo is a continuous source of friction between 
the U.S. and other countries. Virtually all Latin Ameri-
can countries, Canada, the European Union , and the 
U.N. have ca lled on the U.S. to end its embargo of 
Cuba , ci ting violations of international standards of hu-
man rights as well as of international laws. 
The good news is that the worst of the economic cri-
sis in Cuba probably is over. The bad news is that im-
provem ents over the short- or medium-term are un-
likel y without a signif icant shift away from the com-
mand economy and without an easing of the U.S.' em-
bargo . The key to Cuba's economic recovery is to gen-
erate foreign exchange earnings, attract investment, 
and develop links with the U.S., its natural trading part-
ner. Although foreign investment has increased by $500 
million over 1992-1993, it does not compensate Cuba 
for the billions lost in Soviet concessions. Moreover, 
most foreign investment has been limited to the tourist 
sector, the growth of which creates social problems that 
Castro's revolution has been committed to eradicate 
(income inequalities, prostitution, drug use and traffick-
ing, illegal gambling, etc.). Since 1992, Castro has per-
mitted Cubans to hold U.S. dollars, in the hope of gain-
ing increased dollar remittances from Cubans living in 
the U.S. This worked (albeit with negative social conse-
quences) until 1993, when the Clinton Administration 
banned dollar remittances to Cuba. 
The Nature of Castro's Power 
Given the severity of the economic criSis, the dramatic 
decline in living standards, and the lack of alternatives 
under the present socioeconomic structure in Cuba, an 
important question arises: Why doesn't Cuban society 
blame Castro and demand a change? The answer has 
to do with the nature of Castro's hold on power and on 
the Cuban people. First, a hostile U.S. policy of isola-
tion continues to propagate a fear of the U.S. among 
Cubans, a fear that Castro uses to his political advan-
tage. It becomes easier for Castro to blame the U.S. for 
Cuba's problems. Second, Cuba is a totalitarian state: 
secret police, neighborhood committees, and the perva-
sive communist party root out dissidents, create a cli-
mate of mistrust, and effectively hinder any efforts at 
organizing an alternative to Castro either at the grass-
roots level (churches, universities, unions, etc.) or 
among elites within the regime. Third , Castro's 
charisma should not be discounted; he is a master at 
being "one of the people: Castro loves to go out among 
the people to listen to their problems, hear their criti-
cisms, and take personal responsibility for trying to 
solve them. This personal connection with the people 
continues to endear him to the masses, quite unlike the 
communist leaders of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union who became aloof and distant during times of 
crises . Fourth, Cubans are too busy standing in lines, 
walking or riding long distances, or working in emer-
gency brigades (on behalf of the state) to have time to 
organize any opposition. Finally, there exists a perva-
sive sense of fatalistic resignation in Cuba. Most 
Cubans see few viable alternatives to Castro. Many are 
convinced that if Castro goes, then the U.S. and the 
Cuban-American exile community will return to Cuba, 
forcing most of the beneficiaries of the Cuban revolution 
to become losers. Although life with Fidel is hard, it is 
a hardship more or less equally distributed among all 
Cubans. 
U.S. Policy Options 
Since Eisenhower, U.S. policy has been to isolate 
Castro and Cuba economically and politically in the 
hope of containing the spread of communism in the re-
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gion. The key to this policy has been the maintenance 
of a full economic embargo. Arguments in favor of the 
embargo argue that an embargo is necessary to : (1) 
punish Castro for expropriating U.S. companies and em-
bracing the Soviet Union as an ally; (2) prevent Castro 
from consolidating his revolution ; (3) encourage Castro 
to initiate political reform; and (4) send a message to 
other countries that- the U.S. will not tolerate commu-
nism in "its· neighborhood. Although the embargo has 
failed to achieve any of these goals over the course of 
30 years, many continue to insist on its maintenance. It 
is argued that as Cuba no longer can count on extemal 
support, the embargo finally has a chance to succeed in 
toppling Castro. 
There are several arguments against the embargo, 
and these now are being voiced louder and more fre-
quently by "mainstream" policymakers. First, the em-
bargo punishes the Cuban people, not Castro and his 
government; therefore it is immoral. Second, the em-
bargo continues to give Castro the enemy he needs (los 
yanquis) to consolidate and to keep power. Third, the 
embargo has not encouraged political reform in Cuba. 
Finally, now that the Cold War is over, there is no rea-
son to keep the embargo, since Castro and Cuba pose 
no strategic threat to the U.S. 
Probably the most realistic policy option for the U.S. is 
to start using the embargo as a more effective bargain-
ing chip by pursuing an incremental policy of construc-
tive engagement. Such a policy would recognize that 
contemporary U.S. interests in Cuba are changing. The 
U.S. no longer has to worry about limiting Soviet influ-
ence in the Western hemisphere. nor does it need to 
worry about Castro exporting revolution . Instead, the 
U.S. should worry about stability in Cuba and should en-
courage democratic capitalist reform. Rather than wait-
ing for Castro to make the first move and being forced 
merely to react to circumstances of his making (as the 
U.S. historically has done), the U.S. should take the ini-
tiative and stop playing the political game that Castro 
knows how to play so well. 
A policy of constructive engagement with Cuba would 
serve U.S. interests in a number of ways. First, it would 
rob Castro of his enemy and of his favored means of 
keeping power. Second, it would expose the Cuban 
masses and elites to development alternatives via the 
freer exchange of people, ideas, and goods. Third, it 
would give the Cuban people hope, a prerequisite to de-
manding radical change. Fourth, it would allow the U.S. 
to exert more influence over a likely transition in Cuba. 
Finally, constructive engagement would put the U.S. 
more in line with hemispheric and world opinion. No 
other country in the hemisphere supports the continua-
tion of the embargo, and both the European Union and 
the United Nations have called for the U.S. to reevalu-
ate its Cuba policy. The moral credibility of the U.S. as 
a world leader is being damaged by a continued refusal 
to deal constructively with Castro. 
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*** This paper was presenled at a Council on Interna-
tional Affairs Public Lecture at Eastern Kentucky Uni-
versity on September 20, 1994. 
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT 
The 1995 conference of the Midwest Association of 
Latin American Studies will be held in Banos, Ecuador, 
November 18-21, 1995. Full details of the conference, 
as well as a Call for Papers and conference registration 
materials, are available in the February MALAS news-
letter. For more information, contact Dr. Mark Lowry, 
Program Coordinator, at (502) 745-5979, Fax: (502) 
745-6410, Email : mark.lowry@wku.edu, or write to the 
Latin American Stud ies Center at Western Kentucky 
University. 
LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
PUBLIC LECTURE SERIES 
During the Spring semester, the Latin American 
Studies Committee continued its recently established 
Public Lecture Series al the Bowling Green Public Li 
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brary . The lectures are designed to inform members of 
the community about Latin American issues in a re-
laxed, non-academic environment. In January, Dr. 
David J. Keeling presented a slide show and talk titled 
"In Search of the Inca: Travels in Peru." Dr. Keeling's 
presentation contrasted the urban world of Lima, Peru's 
national capital, with the ind igenous world of the Andes 
highlands. Slides of Lima, Machu Pichu, CuzCQ, and 
Lake Titicaca provided audience members with visual 
images of this fascinating area in South America. 
In February, OJ. Richard Pace spoke on ·Spirits, 
Possession, and Mediums in Brazil ." Drawing on re-
search and personal experiences from trips to Brazil , 
Dr. Pace explained the differences between spiritual-
ism and candomble , among other local and regional 
religions, to a large and enthusiastj~ audience. At the 
end of March, Dr. Juan Pena explained the origins of 
the Spanish spoken in Latin America . He.traced the 
diffusion of the language from the various regions of 
Spain to the New World in the 15th and 16th centuries 
and suggested that the Andalusian region in southern 
Spain influenced New World Spanish more than any 
other region in Spain. 
The year ended on a high note with a presentation in 
April by Dr. Margaret Curt is-Howe titled "Ecuador-
Green Horizons." Margaret talked about her recent 
visit to Ecuador as part of a Sister City delegation and 
gave an enthralling account of her experiences in this 
Andean country. Slides of Santo Domingo de los Col-
orados, the beach at Atacames, and the indigenous 
markets in Otavalo demonstrated the varied cultures 
and landscapes that make Latin America so exciting. 
LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
SPRING CONFERENCE 
The annual Latin American Studies Spring Confer-
ence was held at Western Kentucky University on April 
20 and 21 , 1995. Dr. James Wiley from the Depart-
ment of Economics and Geography at Hofstra Univer-
sity in New York presented a fascinating account of 
Central American refugees and the issue of human 
rights. His talk entitled "Returnees and the Internally 
Displaced: Human Rights and Development in 
Guatemala" draw a large and enthusiastic audience. 
On Friday evening, Dr. Wiley joined Lat in American 
Studies faculty , staff, and students at a potluck dinner 
hosted by Dr. Keeling. The sounds of va rious dialects 
of Spanish filled the air as students and faculty alike 
listened to Latin music and discussed their various ex-
periences in Latin America . 
LATIN AMERICA STUDIES SCHOLARSHIP 
Mauricio Sanchez from Venezuela received the 1995 
latin American Student Scholarship Award. Mauricio 
has been active in both drama and dance presentations 
on campus. A $200 book award was presented to 
Mauricio by Dr. David J . Keeling at the University Stu-
dent Awards Ceremony on April 9. The award is given 
in recognition of the student's excellence In scholarship, 
community service, and contribution to international un-
derstanding. 
WKU FACULTY ACTIVITIES 
Dr. Mark Lowry 11 , Department of Geography and 
Geology, spent Fall 1994 on sabbatica l in Ecuador con-
ducting research on severallopics including the impact 
of rapid development on the ind igenous peoples of 
Santo Domingo de los Colorados. Dr. l owry also orga-
nized the in-country components of the 1995 MALAS 
conference, to be held in Banos, November 18-21. 
Or. Margaret Curtis-Howe, Department of Philoso-
phy and Religion, traveled to Santo Domingo de los 
Colorados, Ecuador, in March as a member of the 
Bowling Green Sister City delegation. Margaret coordi-
nated an exchange of written and visual materials be-
tween various high-school students in both cities, as 
well as representing the Rotary Club of Bowling Green. 
Dr. Curtis-Howe presented her experiences in Ecuador 
at a Latin American Studies public lecture in April and 
at a Rotary Club lunch in May. 
Center for Latin American Studies 
Office of International Programs 
Western Kentucky University 
1 Big Red Way 
Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101 
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Ms. Donna Cheshire, Assistant Director of 
International Programs, and Or. John Petersen , 
Director of International Programs, traveled 10 Belize 
in February to represent Western Kentucky University 
at the annual conference of the Consortium of Belize 
Educational Cooperation (COBEC). 
Or. David J. Keeling , D.epartmenl of Geography 
and Geology, visited Ecuador during March 1995. He 
led a group representing the Bowling Green Sister City 
Committee and the International Committee of the 
Chamber of Commerce to Santo Domingo de los 
Colorados. While in Santo Domingo, Or. Keel ing 
helped to establish a Habitat for Humanity committee 
and also presented medical supplies donated from the 
Bowling Green health community to Santo Domingo's 
new clinic. Dr. Keeli ng also spend two wonderful days 
in Ecuador's capital city, Quito, conducting preliminary 
research for a paper to be presented in November at 
the MALAS annual conference in Banos, Ecuador. 
After over two years of resea rch, writing , and 
editing, Or. Keeling finally finished a book on urban 
restructuring in Buenos Aires, Argentina . Part of the 
·Wor1d Cities· series published by John Wiley & Sons, 
the book examines the impact of globalizing the urban 
economy on Buenos Aires' SOCiety and environment. 
The book is due out later in the year. Dr. Keeling 
hopes to return to Argentina later this year to continue 
research on the impact of economic restructuring on 
the various regions of the country. 
Dr. Richard Pace, Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology, spent January in Mexico at the 
Universidad Aut6noma Chapingo as a participant in 
WKU's trilateral affil iation program with Chapingo and 
Trent University in Canada. 
